For Korean exporters, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling against IEEPA-based reciprocal tariffs did not bring clarity. It replaced one legal structure with another. Within days, President Donald Trump invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act to impose a global tariff, later raising it to 15 percent. For Korean SMEs and export-based startups, the shift introduces a 150-day planning window filled with strategic uncertainty.

Korea Convenes Public–Private Meeting After Section 122 Tariff Move

On February 23, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) convened a joint public–private response meeting at the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Seoul. Economic organizations, major industry associations, relevant ministries, and export support institutions attended.

The meeting followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision declaring reciprocal tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) unlawful. Immediately afterward, President Trump announced a 10 percent global tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act and subsequently raised it to 15 percent.

According to the ministry, Section 232 product-specific tariffs remain in effect. The government also anticipates potential investigations under Section 301 and other alternative legal mechanisms. Officials stated that these overlapping tools could generate “complex impacts” on Korean industry and exports.

The government said it will closely monitor U.S. follow-up measures and movements by other countries, aiming to minimize uncertainty for Korean firms.

Why the 150-Day Section 122 Period Matters Now

Section 122 authorizes the U.S. president to impose tariffs of up to 15 percent for a maximum of 150 days in response to balance-of-payments concerns. That time limit is now central.

Legal experts emphasized that the 150-day window could become a turning point. If no replacement legal framework emerges after the period expires, a tariff gap could occur. At the same time, alternative mechanisms such as Section 301 investigations or expanded product tariffs under Section 232 remain available to the U.S. administration.

In practical terms, Korean exporters face at least five months of constrained visibility in U.S. pricing conditions. The uncertainty extends beyond headline tariff rates. It includes refund procedures, investigation risk, and potential sector-specific adjustments.

The Korea International Trade Association noted that if the U.S. tariff structure transitions to a “Most-Favored-Nation tariff plus 15 percent under Section 122” model, Korea’s competitiveness as an FTA partner could improve relative to non-FTA countries. That assessment, however, depends on how the framework evolves after the 150-day period.

Minister Kim Jung-kwan: “Friendly Consultations” and Competitive Adjustment

At the February 23 meeting, Minister Kim Jung-kwan stated that the government will continue “friendly consultations” with the United States to ensure that the balance of benefits secured through prior Korea–U.S. tariff agreements is not undermined.

He warned that if a uniform 15 percent global tariff is applied, changes in relative competitive conditions for Korean companies should be expected.

Kim also said the government will pursue export diversification and competitiveness policies “persistently” and ensure that companies receive timely information regarding uncertainties surrounding tariff refunds.

He noted that additional U.S. measures and developments in other major economies will be closely monitored, and that mid- to long-term response strategies will be explored calmly.

Separately, legal analysts cautioned that tariff refunds following the IEEPA ruling are not automatic. Eligibility may depend on litigation participation and the finalization status of individual import entries.

Legal Authority Shift Without Risk Reduction

The core tension is not about one tariff rate replacing another. It is about the legal architecture.

The Supreme Court invalidated tariffs under IEEPA because the statute does not explicitly authorize tariff imposition. The Trump administration responded by invoking authorities that were explicitly delegated by Congress decades ago, including Sections 122, 301, and 232.

From a Korean SME perspective, the risk did not disappear. It changed channels.

Section 122 creates a temporary tariff structure with a defined duration. Section 301 opens the possibility of targeted investigations into alleged unfair trade practices. Section 232 allows product-specific tariffs tied to national security assessments. Each mechanism carries different procedural and sectoral implications.

For export-dependent SMEs without in-house trade law capacity, the multiplicity of legal tracks complicates planning. The issue is less about a single 15 percent number and more about layered regulatory exposure.

How Section 122 Reshapes U.S. Market Strategy for Korean SMEs

Korean startups and SMEs have increasingly embedded U.S. market access into growth projections. In 2024 and 2025, trade volatility already forced pricing revisions across manufacturing-linked SMEs, especially those tied to steel, automotive parts, and industrial inputs.

Under the Section 122 framework, short-term predictability improves only marginally. A 150-day window is only sufficient for customs implementation. But it is still insufficient for capital allocation or long-term supply chain restructuring.

For technology startups exporting hardware components or advanced materials, tariff exposure intersects with cross-border venture capital decisions. Investors assessing U.S. revenue dependency must now factor in temporary tariff authorities that can be replaced by alternative legal tools at short notice.

The structural question becomes one of risk distribution. Large conglomerates can absorb legal volatility through global production networks. But not all export-based startups and SMEs can do the same. That asymmetry deepens the policy-execution gap between national trade diplomacy and firm-level resilience.

The ministry’s public–private coordination signals awareness of that imbalance. Yet coordination does not eliminate structural exposure.

Planning Inside a Moving Legal Framework

The next five months are not a pause. They are a compressed negotiation phase.

If Section 122 expires without replacement, certain goods could temporarily revert to lower tariff conditions. If replaced by Section 301 findings or expanded Section 232 measures, sector-specific pressure could intensify instead of ease.

Korean SMEs and startups exporting to the United States are therefore operating inside a conditional environment. Pricing models, contract clauses, and refund strategies must now incorporate legal volatility as a baseline assumption.

For global stakeholders, the episode highlights how trade governance is increasingly intertwined with startup risk management. Market access is no longer solely about demand. It is also about statutory interpretation and executive authority.

The 150-day window is not simply a countdown. It is a strategic test of how quickly governments and firms can recalibrate inside shifting legal boundaries.

Key Takeaway on the 150-Day Window for Korea’s Startups and SMEs

• The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated IEEPA-based reciprocal tariffs.
• The Trump administration invoked Section 122 to impose a 15 percent global tariff for up to 150 days.
• Section 232 tariffs remain active, and Section 301 investigations remain possible.
• Korea’s Ministry of Trade convened a public–private response meeting to assess impact and maintain U.S. consultations.
• Tariff refund eligibility remains legally and procedurally uncertain.
• The 150-day limit creates a defined but unstable planning horizon for Korean startups and SMEs exporting to the United States.
• Legal authority shifts do not eliminate trade risk; they redistribute it across alternative statutory channels.

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